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1. Introduction 
 
Can a group of persons constitute a group person? From Plato’s notorious analogy be-
tween the polis and the human soul in the Republic, to Hobbes’ concept of artificial per-
sonhood and Locke, Hume and the following modern discussion of personal identity, 
the idea that personhood is no natural kind, and that persons may come in different 
scopes and sizes, transgressing the boundaries of the human organism, looms large. 
Centuries later, a number of philosophers would press Plato’s analogy further (Parfit 
1986, 211; Korsgaard 1989; Rovane 1998). The question whether individual persons 
can integrate into a single personal unit that differs from ordinary, human-sized persons 
is not only pre-figured in the debate on diachronic and synchronic personal identity, 
but has also been extensively discussed in the German and British legal theory tradi-
tions of the 19th and 20th centuries (cf. Runciman 1997). Most recently, the issue has 
been fuelled by the analytic debate on collective intentionality and group agency.1 Simi-
larly, in times of ever more concentrated corporate power, one can also witness a grow-
ing interest in the respective normative and political questions. For example, it has been 
argued that corporate persons, lacking certain essential capacities for moral conduct and 
accountability, such as affectivity and empathy, exhibit all the features of ‘psychopaths’ 
(Bakan 2004). Meanwhile, some have inquired whether we have proper obligations to-
wards group persons, or whether they have, above and beyond moral accountability 
(French 1979; Manning 1984), any moral or political rights of their own, such as the 
right for protection, the right to persist (Ozar 1985), or the right to freedom of speech 
(Stoll 2005; List/Pettit 2011; Hess 2013; Hindriks 2015).2 
 What is less known is that many phenomenologists, including Husserl (e.g., 1952, 
1973), have complex accounts of group personhood, or have critically engaged in the 
debate on the possibility of such entities.3 Scheler is certainly the figure of the phenom-
enological movement who not only makes most use of the notion, but also has elabo-
rate conceptual requisites, firmly embedded in his personalist value ethics, for dealing 
with the ontological, and especially the normative, implications of group personhood. 
 The present paper aims to reassess Scheler’s account, and with particular attention 
paid to the intricate issue of intentional and normative collectivism. In doing so, I 
whish to show that Scheler’s account, however ambiguous it is at times, is not only 
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equipped to fulfill those central requirements for group personhood that I argue any 
theory of group persons must account for (section 2); but, on the most charitable read-
ing, it also navigates the thin line between merely summative and all-too collectivist 
accounts of group persons. Ultimately, I hope that in sketching this Schelerian path 
(sec. 3 and 4), and by pointing to the strengths and weaknesses of his account (sec. 5), 
we get a better grip of what really is, ontologically and normatively, at stake when one 
collectivizes persons, or personifies collectives. 
 
2. Four Requirements for Group Persons 
 
To begin with, consider the following general requirements that, I contend, any ade-
quate theory of group persons (GP) must fulfill:  
 
(1) Plurality Requirement: GP, qua group persons, must be so construed as to account 
for the fact that they ‘comprise’ a plurality of individuals, allowing also for a cer-
tain ‘intentional variation’ in their mental lives.4  
(2) Integrity Requirement: GP, qua group persons, must be so construed as to account 
for the fact that they not only form a collection or multiplicity of individuals, 
but have a certain integrity as a distinctive person. Moreover, GP must enjoy a 
certain autonomy vis-à-vis the individuals who are their members or constitu-
ents, and vice versa. 
(3) Normativity, or Moral Accountability, Requirement: Given (2) and the commonly held 
specific normative status of individual persons, GP should as well have some 
normative or axiological status, value, or moral right of their own, and/or 
should be morally accountable in their own right.5 
(4) Anti-Collectivism Requirement: Given (1) and certain standard normative require-
ments for individual personhood (autonomy, etc.), GP must not (normatively or 
intentionally) ‘override’ or ‘outflank’ the individuals they comprise (cf. Pettit 
1993; 2014). 
 
While the first requirement should be fairly obvious—no group person without a group 
of persons—and while the second and third are expounded in detail in one or the other 
above-mentioned accounts, rather strikingly, very few current GP-accounts discuss (4), 
i.e., the normative and non-normative (intentional-psychological) relation of GP to in-
dividuals. With a view to this task, Scheler is a good starting point, to say the least.  
 Furthermore, however obvious the plurality requirement may be, some may ques-
tion it by, rightly, assuming the possibility of there being one single individual who 
bears or instantiates properties of a group person. This indeed is a real possibility, espe-
cially for Scheler, as we shall see. Thus, we need to slightly qualify the above require-
ment to the effect that, first, for any GP, there must be, at one point or another, a collec-
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tive of individuals who constitute it and, secondly, once constituted, and even if eventu-
ally instantiated by only a single individual, GP-properties must stand in some relation 
to and allow for a variety of intentional properties of a plurality of individuals. 
 With these preliminaries in place, in the following, I shall show that Scheler’s ac-
count of GP does fulfill all four of these requirements—however ambivalent Scheler 
may be at times, and however much (1)-(4) may prima facie conflict with one another. 
 
3. Scheler’s Concept of Gesamtperson  
  
One of the fundamental claims concerning personhood that virtually all phenomenolo-
gists share concerns its social nature. According to this view, personhood has intrinsi-
cally and irreducibly social aspects. Few phenomenologists, and few philosophers in 
general, have been more explicit and adamant about this than Scheler. One of Scheler’s 
central claims is that (individual or communal) persons have an irreducible social as-
pect, such that even hypothetical Robinson Crusoes are from birth essentially embed-
ded in social relations and have both a non-social, or “intimate sphere” and a “social 
sphere” as their equal co-constituents (Scheler 1926a, 548ff; 1926b, 228ff). Moreover, 
Scheler argues for an irreducible, socio-ontological correlation between individual and 
‘plural’ subjects. He maintains not only that “the I is but a ‘part’ (‘Glied’) of the We and 
We an essential part of the I” (1926b, 225), but that the We, “genetically” viewed, and 
regarding its “reality” and “specific content,” precedes the I (1926c, 52, 57). Going even 
further than this, Scheler argues that it is an a priori feature of personhood that every 
person is a member of a social unity, and that, indeed, insofar as every individual per-
son has a non-individual, or communal, person as her essential part, she, in turn, is and 
experiences herself as a member of a “communal person” (Gesamtperson) (henceforth: CP)6 
and, eventually, as a member of a set of such communal persons.  
 Now, one may wonder why Scheler employs the notion of CP in the first place. 
However, the answer is rather clear: for Scheler, communities have intrinsic values. 
Values, according to his ethical personalism, are founded upon and can only be borne 
by persons. And, since the highest social values belong to certain forms of communi-
ties, they belong not to persons simpliciter, but to communal persons (1926a, 514). Hence, 
for Scheler the attribution of personhood to communities, more than for any other 
reason, clearly is born out of considerations regarding persons as bearers of values. Ac-
cordingly, the concept of CP is not simply a moral- or social-psychological, epistemo-
logical (in the sense of ‘group minds’ (Gruppengeist), as Scheler employs that concept in 
his sociology of knowledge; cf. 1926c, 54f), or merely social-ontological concept. It is 
just as much an axiological, or properly ethical, concept.  
 Two central features—an axiological and an epistemological-cum-ontological 
one—characterize personhood for Scheler. First, persons are the “ultimate” (letzte) and, 
at the same time, the “highest” (höchste) values, and bearers of values (1926a, 103ff, 499, 
514). Secondly, the very ontological nature of persons, apart from being bearers of val-
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ues, is to be unique ‘centres of experiencing’ (Aktzentrum des Er-lebens) (1926a, 103, 382–
392). Accordingly, the proper role of personhood, for Scheler, consists of the integra-
tion of mental and practical acts. Communal persons, in turn, are first and foremost yet 
more complex integrates of such integrations.  
 In order to understand Scheler’s concept of CP, it is crucial to bear in mind what 
CP are not. First, they are neither opposed to, nor in any proper sense contrasted with 
individual persons, nor are they simply a collection or an aggregate thereof. Further-
more, they are not a synthesis, composition or some fusion of individual persons. 
Scheler would also reject the currently dominant view of collective intentionality, ac-
cording to which the (plural) subjects of group agency are constituted by collective 
agreement, or joint commitment (e.g., Gilbert 1989; Searle 1995; Tuomela 2007; cf. 
Scheler 1926a, 512f, 521). Lastly, being a CP most certainly is not a matter of scope. A 
CP, Scheler explicitly tells us, is not some individual of a “wider scope” (1926a, 513).  
 How, then, are CP constituted, and what is their socio-ontological status? Most 
generally viewed, CP are not supra-individuals or macro entities. Rather, they are com-
plex matrices of different levels and depths of the social integration of intentional and 
phenomenal experiences, volitions and actions. CP are “social unities” as well as “expe-
rienced realities” (erlebte Realität; 1926a, 511f). They are constituted by and experienced in 
those specific intentional acts that Scheler calls mutual co-experiencing or co-living 
(Miteinandererleben, Miteinanderleben). It is easy to misunderstand these acts. Their distinc-
tive feature is not some specific type of phenomenal quality, some ‘feeling of together-
ness’ built into them, nor are co-experiences constituted merely by shared types of indi-
viduals’ experiences. Furthermore, it is not essentially a matter of some ‘we’-intentional 
mode, like for example, Tuomela’s (2007) ‘we-mode’, or some Searlean ‘I we-experience 
x’. Neither is it simply a matter of the intentional directedness to some shared inten-
tional object or goal that makes such acts constitutive of communal persons (though, to 
be sure, such acts do have a we-mode intentional directedness). Rather, for Scheler, the 
fact that a subject S is co-experiencing something is a matter of S’s experiencing some-
thing and, at the same time, experiencing herself as a member of a community for 
which, and for whose members, S bears specific relations of solidarity and co-responsibility 
(Mit-Verantwortlichkeit). That is to say that, for Scheler, the experiential and normative 
properties of such social integrations of experiences are inseparably and constitutively 
tied together. CP, then, are constituted, and their personhood essentially consists of, 
more than anything else (e.g., autonomous intentional agents), being “act-centres of 
experiencing within the co-experiencing of persons” (1926, 512), as well as of being 
centers of co-responsibility, or solidarity. 
 Importantly, not only is a CP not a matter of scope, but there is no one ultimate, 
maximum-sized, or all-encompassing CP. Given that CP are “varieties of centers of 
experiencing (mannigfache Zentren des Er-lebens) within the endless totality of co-
experiencing-with-one-another”, precisely by being “never-ending” integrations and re-
integrations of social unities, CP “essentially” are, like concentric circles, contained as 
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social unities within one-another. In other words: every CP essentially has other CP as 
its members, without there being one single ‘meta-CP’ who would contain all other CP 
within itself (1926a, 510, 521).7 As examples of CP, Scheler typically mentions nations 
(but not peoples), states, “cultural circles/regions” (Kulturkreise), and, in its highest and 
purest form, the Church (1915/16, 380; 1916b, 336f; 1926a, 533-548). 
 CP would be not persons for Scheler, if they would not be just as individual as in-
dividual persons. In fact, they bear an individuality of their own. However, a CP is not 
an entity of which one single subject or person can be predicated. But again, and this is 
the very gist of Scheler’s argument, even if not a ‘single subject’ (Einzelperson), CP not 
only have individuality, but they are individuals: “the communal person (…) is as much 
a spiritual (geistig) individual as the individual person” (1926a, 514). CP are not simply the 
phenomenal contents of individual persons’ communal experiences. They are more than 
that: like individuals, they are centers of intentional and experiential acts and, more par-
ticularly, they constitute a “unity of spiritual act-centers” (1926a, 531). And, precisely as 
centers of acts of co-experiencing, they are the proper (formal) subjects of such commu-
nal experiences (1926a, 511). Moreover, being essentially mental/spiritual entities, CP 
have, above and beyond their experiential reality and their individuality, their own voli-
tional and intentional reality. They are experiential unities as well as subjects of whom 
practical intentionality and agency can be predicated (pace Kelly 2011, 6).  
 CP also have an intentional “‘consciousness-of’ that is different from and independent 
of the consciousness-of of the individual persons” (1926a, 512). Although the intentional 
content of the consciousness of CP does transcend individuals’ consciousness—as in-
dividuals’ experiences do not “encompass” the total experiential content of a CP—what 
we have here is not some “mysterious” collective consciousness, transcending altogeth-
er the “kind” of consciousness that individuals have. For, even if in co-experiencing 
there is an excess of intentional content relative to any individual’s experiences—no CP 
is “fully” (ganz) given in any single individual’s experiential life, in much the same way 
as, for Husserl, physical objects are not fully given in single instances of perception—
co-experiencing is still an affair of individuals. It takes place ‘within’ mutually interrelat-
ed but individual persons. Moreover, CP are “given in” and “given for” each and every 
one of its members, irrespective of their standing within the system of co-experiencing. 
In this respect, experiential transcendence notwithstanding, “the consciousness-of of 
the communal person is always contained in the consciousness of a total finite person as 
act-direction [and] is not something transcendent to it” (1926a, 512f). Indeed, what makes 
an individual’s experiencing mutual co-experiencing, and eventually part of a CP’s 
communal experiencing is, over and above the mutual awareness of the respective per-
sons co-experiencing, the recognition that there is an excess of intentional contents vis-
à-vis the individual, upon whose co-experiences those communal ones, nevertheless, 
supervene. At the same time, individuals need not be reflectively aware of (all) the spe-
cifically co-experiential intentional content. However, individuals are (pre-reflectively) 
aware of essentially being members of one or more CP (1926a, 522). To put it more 
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succinctly: the intentional and phenomenal, or experiential, consciousness of CP is 
trans-individual, but not properly speaking collective or supra-individual.8 
 Now, what exactly individuates group persons, for Scheler? Unlike most contem-
porary authors writing on the topic (notably, French 1979, Korsgaard 1989, Rovane 
1998, and Mathiesen 2003), Scheler fails to provide any clear-cut epistemic, practi-
cal/agential or normative criteria of individuation for CP. Given Scheler’s general axi-
ology and his account of ethical personalism, there seems to be a plausible candidate 
nonetheless. On the face of it, the most obvious candidate seems to be the respective 
centres of co-experiencing. This fails to be sufficient to mark off CP from one another, 
however, for centers of co-experiencing, according to Scheler, are essentially, as we 
have seen, embedded in “the endless totality of co-experiencing-with-one-another” 
(1926a, 510). Rather, given Scheler’s idea of the essential incommensurability of indi-
viduals in terms of their values, and in terms of their radical separateness as individual 
bearers of values, here, we seem to have a criterion of individuation for CP. Surely, one 
and the same token or type of bearer of values, i.e., one and the same CP, or the same 
type of CP, may well bear different values. Conversely, however, Scheler maintains that, 
precisely as individuals, and as individual persons, two different CP cannot instantiate the 
same value. Now, if one takes into account that, for Scheler, there is an intrinsic corre-
lation between persons and values, it is easy to see that the mentioned axiological dif-
ference establishes a corresponding difference in the corporate identity of CP.   
 What about the relation of CP to their individual members? The ontological rela-
tion between the concrete individuals (Einzelpersonen) and CP is a relation of—relative—
independence. Just as most institutional collectives are, regarding their persistence, 
more or less immune to membership changes, depending, obviously on their statutory, 
functional, etc. nature, CP are, regarding their personhood and their individuality, inde-
pendent of the intentional acts of any concrete individual, or of individuals taken sepa-
rately or summatively. Conversely, one and the same individual may stand in member-
ship-relations to different CP at the same time. For example, someone may be a 
member of the Catholic Church and a member of the Prussian State. In modern terms, 
CP are multiply realizable, or, as Scheler puts it, “freely variable” vis-à-vis their mem-
bers CP (1926a, 513). However, they are not independent of persons as such. On the 
contrary, as Scheler pointedly remarks: “It is (…) in the person that the mutually related 
individual person and communal person are differentiated, and the idea of the one does not 
represent the ‘foundation’ of the other.” (1926a, 512) Crucially, this does not mean that 
persons would multiply within persons by virtue of their entertaining social relations or 
relations to collectives. Moreover, it is vital to recognize that the relation between 
communal and individual persons is not a foundational relation of any sort, but rather a 
genuine correlation.9 Consider also that the relations between individuals and CP can-
not be understood as exemplifications of part-whole type membership, or mereological 
containment, nor any other ordinary sort of membership relation (cf. 1923/24, 124). 
That is not to say that Scheler would deny that CP have members at all and that they 
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have individual persons as their members. On the contrary: “Indeed, it belongs to the 
essence of all communal persons to have persons as member-persons (Gliedpersonen), 
who are also individual persons.” (1926a, 513) However, persons qua members are not 
simply parts of other persons, namely of CP. Rather, they are complete and autonomous 
personal unities in their own right, who entertain mutual membership-relations, includ-
ing their very membership to certain CP. The phenomenal (i.e., living- and co-
experiencing-together) and normative (i.e., solidarity and co-responsibility) aspects of 
enjoying and maintaining such person-to-person membership-relations define also the 
essence of the relations between individual and communal persons—rather than mer-
eological containment. 
 Scheler, however, is not always immune to a sort of a compositional fallacy, ac-
cording to which, regardless of how cohesive the respective personal properties of a set 
of individuals engaging in some joint endeavour may be, it would nevertheless be 
wrong to infer the existence of one vehicle or bearer of such properties. This becomes 
particularly manifest when he characterizes CP—nota bene precisely contra Ryle’s (1949) 
famous category mistakes examples—by drawing an analogy between, for instance, 
CP’s becoming “macroscopically visible” in communal experiences such as war, or 
„someone flying in a balloon [who] would, all of a sudden, see [the] one city that is 
somehow mysteriously contained in the streets, people (…) carriages, or goods” (1916a, 
274). Moreover, Scheler tells us that “all societal connections of individuals A, B, C, or 
groups G, G1, G2 occur only if A, B, C, or G, G1, G2 belong at the same time to another 
totality (Ganzem) G of a community—one that is not formed by A, B, C, or G, G1, G2, 
which, however, contains them as its members” (1926a, 521). 
 Similarly, Scheler’s talk of infinite containment, or of one CP being nested in one 
another, must be taken literally. Scheler holds that every CP is “essentially always also a 
member of another CP which encompasses a collective of CP” (1926a, 531). Moreover, 
Scheler maintains that it is part of the a priori nature of CP that there is a multiplicity of 
types and instantiations, or tokens, thereof (1926a, 541). He presents us with a rather 
bewildering taxonomy of CP, not only in terms of the mereological interlacement and 
hierarchies of lower- and higher-order CP, but also in terms of different types of CP. 
There are three main types of CP that are associated with different functions (such as 
the establishment and regulation of systems of laws, rights, etc., and the furtherance of 
individual and communal well-being, welfare, etc.) and different values (“values of 
rights”, “of power” and “of welfare”): (i.) “pure spiritual CP” (reine geistige) or “cultural 
CP”, in particular, nations and so-called “cultural regions” (Kulturkreise); (ii.) the State 
(as distinct from both peoples and nations); and, finally, as a sort of synthesis, or ‘coin-
cidence’ of (i.) and (ii.), (iii.), the “perfect spiritual CP”, i.e., the “state-nation”, the “cul-
tural nation” and, as the highest-ranked CP of all, the Church, viewed as the universal 
“community of love”, in which all spiritual individual persons partake (1926a, 531, 
545).10  
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 Notice a further stratification: as we have seen, in Scheler’s social phenomenology 
of personhood, individual persons are, irreducibly, interrelated and, accordingly, there is 
an interlacement of different strata and different types of personhood (social, intimate, 
communal)—notwithstanding the fact that persons are individuated solely by them-
selves, and also have their, though purely axiological, essences ‘in’ themselves  (1926b, 
44). Now consider that the distinction between the social and intimate spheres of per-
sons is orthogonal to the distinction between individual and communal persons. The 
former distinction applies just as much to communal as to individual persons: CP have 
their own intimate sphere, which is relative to either other CP, with whom they enter-
tain social relations (1926a, 549), or the community of CP, or a higher order CP, of 
which the given CP is a member. Take, for instance, a UN member-state’s socio-
economic or political life, which may be independent of specific UN policies.  
 Furthermore, the concept of CP is also embedded in a network of conceptual 
distinctions with regard to the ontological, axiological and normative structure of social 
reality. Scheler employs, for example, the well-known distinction made by Tönnies be-
tween society and community for marking four distinct types of “social unities” (1926a, 
517; 1926c, 33). Without going into the details here (cf. Vendrell Ferran’s contribution 
in this volume), suffice it to say that in the context of these distinctions Scheler refers 
to a CP as a “personalist system of solidarity of autonomous, self- and co-responsible 
individuals”, or as “the personal-solidary association of non-representable (unvertretbar) 
individuals” (1926c, 33, 45). What primarily distinguishes CP from other, non-personal, 
collectives is that only the goal-directed volitions or intentional actions of the former 
bear any autonomy and sovereignty over the particular interests of their individual, or 
even communal, members (1926a, 531). 
 The difference in accountability also corresponds to a difference in the respective 
principle of solidarity: in life-communities, the “principle of representable solidarity” 
reigns. Individuals are hereby interchangeable, for every individual is considered to be 
co-responsible only for some communal value. In CP, on the other hand, we have the 
principle of “non-representable solidarity” (unvertretbar), according to which each and 
every individual is responsible for herself (self-responsibility) as well as co-responsible 
for all other members and their total integration in the CP. With this distinction, we 
enter the normative dimension of CP, and face the issue of collectivism versus anti-
collectivism. 
 
4. Beyond Collectivism and Anti-Collectivism? 
 
So far I aimed to show that Scheler’s concept of CP fulfills the above plurality, integrity 
and normativity requirements (1)-(3). Though CP are constituted by the co-experiences 
and co-solidarity of a plurality of incommensurable individuals, they enjoy relative in-
dependence and autonomy vis-à-vis their members and are, as persons, also morally 
accountable. Now, what about the further normative implications and, in particular, the 
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anti-collectivism requirement? In the remainder, I shall argue that, despite any ambigui-
ties and occasional collectivistic undertones, Scheler’s concept of CP is, ultimately, anti-
collectivist in spirit, or, at the very least, compatible with anti-collectivism. 
 Recall that anti-collectivism is the view that individual personhood is not com-
promised, outflanked or overridden by collectives—that the respective individuals be-
long to as members or not—and the intentional and normative laws governing such 
collectives. Notice that the normative version of anti-collectivism does not necessarily 
amount to a view that List and Pettit call “normative individualism,” according to 
which “whether or not a group person should exist, and whether it should function 
within this or that regime of obligation, should be settled by reference to the rights or 
benefits of the individuals affected, members and non-members alike” (List/Pettit 
2011, 182).11 Although not incompatible with such normative individualism, Scheler’s 
normative anti-collectivism is certainly not identical with it.  
 Consider the following claims, which formulate different aspects and strengths of 
(normative and non-normative) anti-collectivism: 
 
(i.)  The personhood of individuals is co-constituted by their intersubjective 
and membership relations to CP (and CP’s personhood-properties). 
(ii.)  Individuals bear certain normative relations of accountability and co-
responsibility to CP (and possibly vice versa). 
(iii.)  The personhood of individuals is derived from and/or reducible to the re-
lations in (i.). 
(iv.)  The axiological status, or value, of individual persons is derived from the 
CP they belong to, and/or from the function they have for promoting 
those CP, and for which they are exclusively accountable. 
 
Notice that (i.) formulates a version of social holism12 regarding non-normative (inten-
tional-psychological or otherwise) relations between individuals and CP, while (ii.) and 
(iii.) target their normative and axiological relations. Accordingly, we may distinguish 
intentional from normative collectivism. Furthermore, (iii.) resonates with Scheler’s ideas 
on “value collectivism” (Wertkollektivismus), according to which a person’s value is to be 
measured against his contribution to a collective, and on “causal collectivism” (Kausal-
kollektivismus), according to which a person’s value is to be measured against the value 
of the historical development of communities (1926a, 495f). Scheler rejects both ver-
sions, to be sure. Contrary to (iii.), then, Scheler—the unmistakable elitist he is—holds 
that the criterion for measuring the value of a community (and of history) is the extent 
to which it promotes the ‘ontic value’ (Seinswert) of the maximum number of (individual 
and communal) persons of the highest value (1926a, 495). Notice how this, even if not 
incompatible, rubs up uncomfortably against normative individualism. 
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 Obviously, various combinations of (i.) to (iv.) will result in different strengths of 
(anti-)collectivism. Thus, (i.) and (ii.), taken either in conjunction or disjunctively, are 
compatible with a robust anti-collectivism, while (iii.) and/or (iv.) are not and, taken 
together, amount to the strongest form of collectivism. I take Scheler to endorse pre-
cisely (i.) and (ii.)—neither more, nor less. 
 However, even though he certainly does not embrace collectivism head-on any-
where in his work, it is no coincidence that reading Scheler often strikes a (quasi-
)collectivist chord. Thus, even with a view to the largely non-normative issue of wheth-
er the personhood of individuals is only co-constituted by (i.) or rather derived from 
their membership relation to collectives or to CP (iii.), Scheler is far from offering a 
clear-cut explanation. On the one hand, he argues that persons essentially have both an 
intimate as well as a social sphere and, hence, that their very personhood is (holistically) 
co-constituted by interpersonal relations. Moreover, he holds that persons are, in part, 
what they are, by means of their irreducible membership in communities and, ultimate-
ly, in CP. On the other hand, Scheler time and again insists on the irreducible individu-
ality and the normative and non-normative incommensurability of individual persons. 
He could not be more precise about rejecting collectivism with regard to any alleged 
constitutional or axiological hierarchy between individual and communal persons when 
he writes: “every person is with equal originality (gleichursprünglich) both an individual 
person and (essentially) a member of a communal person, and one’s own value (Eigen-
wert) as an individual is independent of one’s value as a member” (1926a, 514).  
 And, yet, nowhere is Scheler’s oscillation between collectivism and anti-
collectivism clearer than in passages of his notorious essay, War as Communal Experience 
(1916a). Three claims, which prima facie are in tension with one another, stand out here: 
(1) there are communal experiences (Gesamterlebnis), as in a “national experience” of the 
Great War, which a.) are not a “highly complex aggregation (Zusammensetzung) of indi-
vidual experiences, enriched with common knowledge or presumption”, but the co-
experiencing of one and the same (token) of experience, and which b.) may not only be 
by far larger, but also “more colourful and richer” than either any contingent individual 
experience thereof or the summation of all individual experiences (1916a, 273; cf. 
1926a, 516; 1926b, 23f). (2) A CP, e.g., the State, can, and indeed ought to, lay certain 
claims (fordern) on individuals for its own sake and prosperity, especially since a CP’s 
existence typically outlives the lifespan of its members. (3) Finally, however, CP ought 
to lay claim on individuals only if they “respect” individuals’ intrinsic, and indeed “eter-
nal,” value (1916a, 280f).  
 Now, on closer scrutiny, the tension is easily resolved. For, while (2) is simply 
normatively conditional upon (3), both are normative considerations that do not affect 
there being (or not being) certain irreducible collective intentional and/or phenomenal 
patterns of communal experiences. In other words, the tension dissolves once we 
properly distinguish between normative and intentional (anti-)collectivism. 
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 At first glance, a similar tension seems to presents itself when one considers 
Scheler’s intricate concept of co-responsibility and, in particular, his concept of “com-
munal guilt” (Gesamtschuld). Thus, on the one hand, Scheler suggests a strongly collectiv-
ist interpretation of the principle of solidarity—the “highest axiom of social ethics and 
social philosophy” (1926b, 209f)—by claiming that, due to this principle, and the origi-
nal co-responsibility of individuals for one another that it entails, every individual per-
son bears and partakes in, in addition to her individual accountability, “communal mer-
it” or guilt, which, to be sure, “cannot be added up by the sum of the merit or guilt of 
the respective individuals” (1926a, 488f). Moreover, though a given individual S is not 
(collectively or individually) responsible for any concrete collective action, unless S has 
in fact been “causally and volitionally involved” in the given action (1926a, 522), S’s 
overall co-responsibility for others and for some CP is grounded in the very nature of 
there being an ethical community of persons, rather than in S’s complicity or concrete 
action. On the other hand, and in contrast to the strongly collectivist principle of (rep-
resentable) solidarity in life-communities, insofar as individual and communal persons 
are concerned, self- and co-responsibility are co-original and always co-instantiated. 
Hence, it is not the case that an individual’s self-responsibility is derived from or 
founded upon her co-responsibility for others, or for CP: 
 
In marked contrast to the life-community where the bearer of all responsibility is the 
communal reality, and the individual is only co-responsible, in the communal person, 
each individual as well as the communal person are self-responsible (responsible for one-
self), and at the same time, every individual is also co-responsible for the communal per-
son (and for every individual ‘in’ the communal person), just as the communal person is 
co-responsible for each of its members. Hence, co-responsibility between individual and 
communal person is mutual and does not preclude self-responsibility on the part of both 
(…) there is neither an ultimate responsibility of the individual to the communal person, 
as in the case of life-community, nor an ultimate responsibility of the communal person 
to the individual (or to the sum or a majority of individuals), as in the case of society. 
(1926a, 522; cf. 548) 
 
Moreover, as Scheler continues this passage, the co-originality of self- and co-
responsibility is evidenced by Scheler’s onto-theological claim that “both the communal 
person and the individual person are responsible to the person of all persons, to God, 
and indeed in terms of self-responsibility as well as co-responsibility” (ibid.). Further-
more, since every CP is essentially also a member of other CP, every CP is just as co-
responsible for other CP (same-level as well as higher-level ones) as for its own individ-
ual members (1926a, 531). 
  Consider also that the principle of non-representable solidarity precludes 
any fusion of individuals in a community or any identification of individuals and com-
munity. Indeed, the very concept of co-responsibility, the responsibility of an individual 
for CP and the responsibility of CP for the individual, presupposes that CP and indi-
vidual persons neither coincide, nor are fused (cf. Henckmann 1998, 131). Otherwise, 
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obviously, talk of co-responsibility would not make sense, and self-responsibility would 
be the appropriate concept. Analogously, Scheler lays particular stress on the fact that 
‘pure’ sympathy (reines Mitfühlen), as well as re- or co-experiencing another’s mental life 
(Mit-fühlen, Mit-erleben), is only possible if there is neither emotional contagion, nor mere 
reproduction, nor, importantly, emotional fusion or identification (Einsfühlung) of the 
respective persons’ experiences (1926b, 23ff, 48ff, 75).13  
 At times, Scheler even ponders whether moral consciousness, conscience, sense 
of duty, or moral phenomena in general, would still exist were there no sociality (Sozie-
tät), or whether moral phenomena are necessarily and exclusively social phenomena. 
Interestingly, Scheler explicitly denies that (1926b, 83). He also cautions against an 
overtly holistic socialization of conscience when he remarks that our very ethical being 
is not affected by any suggestive power, to the effect that an individual would become 
culpable just because she internalizes some social verdict about her culpability (1926b, 
18). 
 Lastly, consider also Scheler’s nuanced opposition to Durkheimian ‘sociologism’ 
(Soziologismus), social determinism and conventionalism. Analogous to his concept of co-
responsibility, in his sociology of knowledge, is Scheler’s advocacy of a co-determination 
between mind, knowledge and society. Thus, he argues that society and its “dominant 
perspective of social interests” only “co-determine” (mitbedingt) the “forms” of cogni-
tion, perception and knowledge (i.e., the intentional psychology) and “the selection of 
objects of knowledge”—not, however, as sociologism, a “pendant of psychologism”, 
would have it, the epistemic content, let alone the epistemological validity of thoughts 
or theories (1926c, 57f). 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
What are the merits of Scheler’s account of group persons, and where does it run the 
risk of overextending the concept? Three features of the theory stand out positively, 
especially against standard contemporary accounts: (1) its internal differentiation, 
providing, if not a fully worked-out taxonomy, at least an account of layers, sedimenta-
tions or grades of integrations of corporate personhood within the social reality of indi-
viduals; (2) its phenomenological or experiential qualities, and, (3) finally, its normative 
or axiological dimension. Notice that all this complies especially well with the integrity 
and moral accountability requirements and is, as I have argued, not incompatible with 
the anti-collectivism requirement to say the least (and, a fortiori, complies with the plu-
rality requirement). 
 Again, for Scheler, the experiential, or phenomenal, and normative aspects of the 
process of integrating centres of (co-)experiencing into one another, and into a com-
munal center of such, viz. a CP, are inseparably and constitutively tied together. This is 
both an advantage—the account thus yields a phenomenologically richer conception of 
group identification—but it certainly bears some risks. To be sure, as CP, for Scheler, 
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are tightly embedded in systems of co-experiences and co-responsibility, the argument 
that corporate entities lack certain essential capacities for moral conduct, such as empa-
thy and affectivity, and that corporate persons would, hence, typically exhibit ‘psycho-
pathic’ behaviour (Bakan 2004), loses its force. And, even if the Schelerian construal is 
not committed to any arguably unjustified form of collective (phenomenal) conscious-
ness to GP (cf. Szanto 2014), or some strong version of collectivism, Scheler’s account 
does reinforce certain normative questions, in ways that might press all too many politi-
cal sensibilities today.  
 It is precisely Scheler’s insistence on a particularly strong form of social holism—
i.e., his insistence on an irreducible and ineliminable correlation between individual and 
corporate personhood—that makes his account at once phenomenologically, and in-
deed metaphysically, plausible, but also vulnerable to troubling normative concerns. 
For, if Scheler is right, it seems that one must bite the bullet and concede certain moral 
rights to or obligations to CP. For example, one will have to be prepared to hold that 
corporate persons, in principle, will have just the same right for respect, esteem and 
protection as individual persons, or even the moral right to persist (Ozar 1985). At the 
most extreme, we might end up with a view that the British political pluralist and con-
temporary of Scheler, Figgis, pointedly formulated—with a view to the Church, and 
congenial to Scheler’s onto-theological underpinning of the concept—according to 
which the denial of the personality of (some) corporations equals the “tyrannical and 
unjust” denial of human personality in “slavery” (Figgis 1913, 42). But this seems too 
big a socio-political price to pay just for being socio-ontologically plausible. Or, is it? 
We may decide in the end, however, that Scheler’s account of CP can, I submit, serve 
as one of the most instructive philosophical case studies on how intricate the relation 
between the autonomy of individuals, the integrity of group persons, and the threat of 
collectivism, ultimately, is.  
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1 For different stances on group personhood within this paradigm, see esp. Rovane 1998; Mathiesen 
2003; Sheehy 2006; Tollefsen 2003; List/Pettit 2011, and Huebner 2014; for a systematic phenomeno-
logical re-assessment of the contemporary discussion, see Szanto 2015c in preparation. 
2 This is particularly pertinent since the recent Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010) US 
Supreme Court ruling, according to which corporations are entitled to free speech rights under the First 
Amendment; http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-205.pdf; cf. Hess 2013. 
3 Most critical of all phenomenologists were Schütz (esp. 1957, 114f) and Kaufmann (1944, 163f; 1930 
307) we find more balanced, though still skeptical, views in Stein 1920, Hildebrand 1930 and Walther 
1923, and Hartmann 1924, but also somewhat different tone with regard to Scheler in Schütz 1958, esp. 
500f., and 1953, 38f; on former, see Salice’s contribution to this volume, on the latter Caminada 2014, 
and generally for details Szanto 2005c; on Husserl and on Stein, see Szanto 2015a and 2015b, respective-
ly.  
4 Cf. also Gilbert 1989, Mathiesen 2003 and Chelstrom 2013. 
5 See, however, Hess’s (2013) criticism of the entailment of moral agency and personhood. 
6 Because of its summative connotations, I shall not use the standard translation for Gesamtperson, ‘collec-
tive person’. Consider also that Scheler uses the attribute ‘collective’, e.g., in combination with collective 
values (Kollektivwerte) to refer to societal and not communal social relations (1926a, 119f).  
7 It should be noted, though, that Scheler is highly ambivalent about the dialectical role or teleological 
status of the “highest” “cultural CP,” i.e., the Church; thus, he sometimes suggests that all other CP are 
somehow ‘synthesized’ by the Church’s alleged unitary bond of solidarity (solidarische Einheit) into one 
whole “pure and perfect CP” (reine vollkommene), cf., e.g., 542-544. 
8 See more on this in Chelstrom 2013, and Szanto 2014a and 2014b. 
9 In this respect, Scheler’s Gesamtperson significantly differs from Husserl’s otherwise rather similar con-
cept of ‘higher order persons’, cf. Szanto 2015a. 
10 Similarly, for the conservative Scruton (1989), the paradigm corporate person is the Church. 
11 Cf., critically, Hindriks 2015 and Kusch 2015. 
12 On the holism issue, see also the formulation in the Introduction of this volume. 
13 On the affective dimension of CP, and on Scheler’s theory of emotions, see Mulligan 2008, Vendrell 
Ferran’s and Krueger’s contributions in this volume, as well as Vendrell Ferran 2008, and on Scheler’s 
theory empathy Zahavi 2010. 
